HAIEC Manufacturing Assurance

From AI authority to verified manufacturing consequences.

Built on HAIEC's five-plane assurance architecture and extended with manufacturing ontologies, semantics, deterministic controls and independent effect evidence. A realistic synthetic manufacturing enterprise — nine AI systems, 27 scenarios — evaluated how HAIEC detects consequential action divergence, establishes qualified evidence and produces inspectable assurance outcomes.

Executive Command Center → Public sample Master Report ↗ Sample PDF ↗

What HAIEC demonstrated

Verified facts across the manufacturing program — genuine persisted HAIEC engine output over a purpose-built synthetic manufacturing scenario laboratory.

Program9 systems · 27 evaluations

Nine synthetic manufacturing AI systems across three scenario states, evaluated by the canonical HAIEC engine — 27 persisted, digest-verified results.

Findings9 qualified divergences

Nine wrong-target rule findings (MFG-EFF-001 MATCH) — a qualified divergence between the approved work order and the recorded effect.

Controls18 receipt-bound R01 results

Effect-witness UCP receipts bound to evaluations; nine degraded-coverage cases carry no receipt — an absent facet, never a silent pass.

ExtensionIndustry-specific intelligence

Manufacturing ontology, semantics, producer qualification and deterministic rules added on the reusable five-plane architecture — the core engine unchanged.

IntegrityDeterministic digests

Core-truth, evidence-bundle, snapshot and export digests bind every report — authenticated upstream evidence → deterministic evaluation → bound receipts → verifiable reports.

HonestyAn explicit proof frontier

Every result names what it does not establish. Unknown and not-assessed states are rendered, never silently cleared.

From telecom to manufacturing

One HAIEC assurance architecture, industry-specific intelligence — the five independent evidence planes were developed and demonstrated through telecom AI assurance work; manufacturing added ontology, semantics, producer qualification and rules, not a new engine.

ReusedThe core architecture

Five-plane model · canonical evaluation engine · evidence & report identity · UCP control-test mechanism · deterministic findings · integrity verification.

AddedManufacturing intelligence

Domain entities · operation/target semantics · producer profiles · effect-readback requirements · manufacturing control applicability.

ValidatedControlled synthetic environment

A fictional manufacturer with realistic industrial workflows — not a production deployment or field event.

What HAIEC separates

Three distinctions the product never blurs — applied verbatim inside the manufacturing evaluation.

Permission ≠ delegationValid access is not authorized choice

A credential can permit an action no accountable human ever delegated. HAIEC keeps the capability plane and the authority plane independent.

Witnessed ≠ authorizedAn observed effect is not an approved one

Independent readback can prove a work-order target changed while the approval question remains separately evaluated — or NOT_ASSESSED.

Digest ≠ signatureIntegrity is not issuer authenticity

SHA-256 verification proves a frozen export is unaltered since persistence. Issuer-signed manifests are a documented roadmap item, honestly labeled.

The pitch — watch it

“Deterministic Proof for AI Agents: Evidence-Bound Assurance” — the report walkthrough and product pitch.

Concept visuals

Framework illustrations from the HAIEC design material. These explain concepts — they are not measured results.

Permission versus delegation — evaluating AI agent security across five evidence planes
ConceptPermission vs. Delegation. Traditional permission checks ask what a credential allows; delegated business authority asks what an accountable human authorized — evaluated across five independent evidence planes.
Five evidence planes, one evaluation — what each plane answers and its source of truth
ConceptFive planes, one evaluation. Requested, policy-authorized, effectively granted, code-capable and observed each answer a different question with a different source of truth.
Shipped engineDelegated Action Integrity — nine bounded dimensions.

HAIEC's deterministic dai-evaluation-1.0.0 engine compares delegated authority against code capability, effective grants and observed actions across nine dimensions — MATCHES · BROADER · NARROWER · MISSING · UNKNOWN per dimension.

OPERATIONTARGETSCOPEMAGNITUDEDURATIONAPPROVALDATA_CLASSENVIRONMENTGEOGRAPHY

The SYS-217 snapshot binds no DAI input — surfaces with no approved operating envelope produce NOT_ASSESSED, never a breach state.

Assumed versus proven — what security tooling asserts versus what evidence establishes
ConceptAssumed vs. proven. The core HAIEC stance: absence of evidence stays unknown — it is never silently cleared into a pass.
Concept rendering of an assurance telemetry console
ConceptAssurance telemetry console. Design exploration for dense, evidence-bound presentation — the shipped Executive Command Center renders only verified export data.

Pitch deck

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HAIEC — Cryptographic Assurance

The full pitch deck: evidence-bound assurance, the five-plane model, the manufacturing case and the assurance report product.

Open deck (PDF) ↗

Into the demo

A seven-module command center driven entirely by 27 frozen, digest-verified HAIEC evaluations over a synthetic manufacturing corpus.

Executive Command Center → Evidence replay — inside the demo Sample Master Report ↗